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Abstract  A Smart grid is a modern electricity delivery system. It is an integration of energy systems and other 
necessary elements including traditional upgrades and new grid technologies with renewable generation and 
increased consumer storage. It uses information and communication technology (ICT) to operate, monitor and 
control data between the generation source and the end user. Smart grids have duplex power flow and 
communication to achieve high efficiency, reliability, environmental, economics, security and safety standards. 
However, along with unique facilities, smart grids face security challenges such as access control, connectivity, fault 
tolerance, privacy, and other security issues. Cyber-attacks, in the recent past, on critical infrastructure including 
smart grids have highlighted security as a major requirement for smart grids. Therefore, cryptography and key 
management are necessary for smart grids to become secure and realizable. Key management schemes are processes 
of key organizational frameworks, distribution, generation, refresh and key storage policies. Currently, several 
secure schemes, related to key management for smart grid have been proposed to achieve end-to-end secure 
communication. This paper presents a comprehensive survey and discussion on the current state of the key 
management of smart grids. 
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1. Introduction 
The smart grid is an electricity system with bi-
directional power flows and communications between the 
utility provider and end user. Processes are automated and 
use sensors to communicate and monitor. Intelligent 
computational devices provide security, efficiency and 
reliability in the electricity system grid. Smart grids are 
able to deal with a large number of customers, enabling a 
timely, secure and adaptable information flow, which is 
needed to provide power to the evolving digital economy.  
One of the main advantages of the smart grid is a model 
system of monitors which fosters communication between 
the power utility and the end user. This communication 
life-cycle involves; sending generated electricity to the 
distribution centre/power storage where it can be 
dispersed depending on need. During the power transfer 
from distribution to user, the utility company has the 
ability to monitor the process using sensors. The 
information recorded can include current electricity 
residence and the amount of potential energy being sent. 
Using this information, utility companies manage the 
zones of high use, detect power failure, control and store 
unneeded power and provide a suitable service. The data 
collected during peak times can be used to ensure high 
demand is adequately met and provided for [1].  
Typical smart grid components tend to include smart 
electronic hardware, which controls and manages the 
distribution and transmission grids. Automation 
applications, such as distribution management 
applications and energy management applications to 
provide real-time control over transmission and 
distribution, also comprise a significant part of the grid 
mechanisms [1]. Each component delivers information 
about their operations and tasks, which is forwarded to 
centralized systems for automation. This data is used to 
improve the reliability and efficiency of the system. 
In 2009, US President, Barack Obama, announced an 
investment grant program totalling $3.4 billion for the 
development of smart grid networks in the USA [2]. As 
present grids need improvement, due to age and growing 
demand, there are many factors that encourage world 
governments to invest more in smart grids. Further more, 
traditional electricity suffers from many issues, such as 
limited control, down falls and black outs, manual 
monitoring and one-way communication [3]. The 
following are the expected benefits for utilities, consumers 
and society offered by the introduction of smart grids: 
•  Reliability—Smart grids are more reliable than the 
traditional grid infrastructure [4]. 
•  Business economics—The introduction of future 
smart grids is expected to improve the economics for 
both utility companies and end users. For utility 
companies there will be opportunities for new energy 
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sources. Particularly, theft of service is reduced from 
efficient management of billing [5]. 
•  Efficiency—By upgrading the traditional power grid, 
several new features are added to the power grid 
system to improve its efficiency. For example, 
improved efficiency in the smart grid is reductions in 
peak load and transmission congestion costs. Smart 
grids are able to intelligently integrate all the users to 
improve operator control and decrease the cost of 
generation [6]. 
•  Safety—Decreasing accidents and providing a fault-
tolerant system prevents voltage spikes caused by 
grid-related events [7]. 
Despite its numerous advantages, there are many 
security challenges and issues with smart grids. Access 
control, identity management, connectivity, privacy, cyber 
malicious attacks and other issues are challenges, which 
the smart grid must contend with. Recent cyber-attacks, 
such as Stuxnet, on critical infrastructures have 
highlighted security as a major requirement for smart grids 
[8]. Cryptographic issues, such as data encryption and key 
management, are important security considerations which 
must be addressed to guarantee safe and secure grid 
operations. 
Key management is a process of controlling access to 
and validating keys in cryptographic systems. This 
involves key generation, keys distribution, key storage and 
key updates. Key management is one of the most 
important security requirements to achieve data 
confidentiality and integrity in smart grids. However, 
smart grids consist of multiple components and 
applications, which imply key management schemes are a 
challenge to implement. In addition, there are a 
significantly large number of components, such as power 
generators, smart applications, system integrators etc. with 
different security levels and security requirements.  
Many key management solutions have been proposed to 
fulfil the security requirements of smart grids. This survey 
presented in this paper summarizes the current state of the 
art on the key management for smart grids. The 
advantages and limitations of each solution are 
highlighted. The aim of this paper is to assist researchers, 
and provide and introductory background knowledge and 
understanding of key management for smart grids. The 
rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background research into Smart Grids. Section 3 presents 
the existing literature in Smart Grid Networks and the 
security challenges on such networks. Section 4 presents 
an overview of cryptographic key management and 
literature that propose security schemes for Smart Grid 
Networks. Section 5 dwells in detail on Key Management 
for the AMI in the Smart Grid. Section 6 presents the 
privacy issues in the Smart Grid and Section 7 concludes 
the survey.  
2. Smart Grid Background Research  
Existing traditional power grids provide a consistent 
one-way power distribution to end-users. However, they 
face issues that need to be addressed in the future. The two 
main problems include slow reaction time and lack of real 
time monitoring. Broader issues which need to be 
addressed include, depletion of primary energy resources, 
climate change, reliability issues, diversification of energy 
generation and unintelligent systems, to name a few [9]. 
Smart grids are intelligent, with the capability to control 
and monitoring different devices and grid components for 
the provision of optimal energy generation and usage [9]. 
In this section, we describe the architecture for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and 
explain how control systems play a key role in the 
development of the smart grid. 
2.1. SCADA system  
SCADA is just one example of a control system, which 
plays an important role in the smart grid. SCADA is 
distributed system used to control and monitor 
geographically dispersed resources spread over a huge 
area of several square miles. Centralized data acquisition 
and controls are critical to the system’s operation. 
Typically, SCADA systems are used in distribution 
systems such as gas pipelines, water, oil and electrical 
grids [10]. The technology used in SCADA systems helps 
smart grids to reduce operational and maintenance costs, 
and ensure the reliability of power supply. Hence, without 
a secure SCADA system, it is impossible to deploy a 
smart grid system [11]. 
Following are the major components of a SCADA 
system: 
•  Human Operator—Every SCADA system is 
controlled and monitored by a human operator [12].  
•  Human Machine Interface (HMI)—the operator 
controls the system by analysing various types of 
inputs such as graphs, charts and schematics. 
Therefore, the HMI allows the operator to view the 
status of the process. There are many technologies 
such as web browsers [12] that can support HMI.  
•  Master Terminal Unit (MTU)—The MTU works as a 
master in the master/slave architecture. It manages 
the high-level operation of the process. This unit 
provides responses based on the data collected from 
another site to the operator via the HMI. The remote 
site then receives a control signal which is 
transmitted by the MTU [13]. In other words, the 
MTU sends control commands and collects updates 
from sensors in field devices to allow for high-level 
control.  
•  Communications system—The MTU and remote site 
communicate by means of wired or wireless systems, 
e.g., the Internet or satellites. They can use different 
network protocols, such as TCP/IP or field bus 
protocols [12].  
•  Remote terminal unit (RTU)—RTUs work like a 
slave in the master/slave architecture. Signals are 
sent to the device under control, and data are 
obtained from these devices and then transmitted to 
the MTU. RTU is also referred as a programmable 
logic controller (PLC) and the communication in the 
RTU is two-way [14]. The RTU can also be 
described as a microprocessor that controls sensors 
and actuators that interact with the real world. 
However, there are some limitations in RTUs such as 
memory and processing power, where the standard 
protocols are 16-bit microspores and 8 KB of RAM 
[12].  
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Figure 1 displays a high-level view of a SCADA 
system with its components.  
 
Figure 1. Components of a SCADA System 
The data transported in the SCADA system can be 
sensitive; therefore, it must be protected from 
unauthorized access. Consequently, SCADA systems are 
paramount to the national security of the country because 
these systems control and manage the power, water, oil, 
gas, chemical, electric, telecommunications and a number 
of other foundations. Unauthorized access to these 
SCADA systems by malicious users may result in the 
retrieval of sensitive data and result in these systems 
becoming inoperable or exposed. Maintaining and 
securing the data in the SCADA systems are crucial to 
avoid any disruption to the normal lives of the people in 
the country. Investing in the security of the SCADA 
system will prevent future financial losses due to the 
system being hacked or broken as a result of security 
weaknesses [15]. 
2.2. Smart Meters and Smart House 
Appliances 
The implementation of the smart grid brings with it the 
integration of smart house appliances for enhanced energy 
monitoring. Smart house appliances (smart and legacy) are 
expected to be able to communicate with smart meters via 
a home area network (HAN), which will assist in efficient 
energy intake and control to all home devices. One key 
appliance is the smart meter, which consists of a 
microcontroller that has memory, digital ports, timers, 
real-time and serial communication facilities [16]. A smart 
meter is an electricity meter that reads and records a user’s 
power consumption and enables data collection for the 
remote monitoring interface known as an advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI). Each device is able to 
record the power intake and transmit it to the utility server, 
connect or detach a customer source of energy and send 
out alarms in case of an error. Power utilities 
communicate with smart meters to control energy intake 
[17].  
The AMI is a system, which gathers data, measures and 
analyses electricity using smart meters and service 
providers to offer two-way communication [18]. An AMI 
system involves different technologies and applications 
including smart meters, user gateways, home area network, 
wide-area communications infrastructure, and meter data 
management systems (MDMSs), Each are integrated to 
perform as one system [19]. The approach is used to 
collect, store, analyse, and measure electric usage data. In 
effect, a gateway between the consumer and electric 
supply is provided [20].  
2.3. An Overview of Smart Grid Architecture 
In this sub-section, smart grid architecture is introduced. 
A discussion is put forward on the functionalities of each 
layer and related communication technologies are 
highlighted. 
In the smart grid architecture, there are four layers. This 
includes: a power system layer; a power control layer; a 
communication layer and an application layer. Figure 2 
shows an overview of smart grid architecture.  
 
Figure 2. An overview of the smart grid architecture 
The power system layer involves electricity generation, 
distribution and customer premise. The power control 
layer is comprised of sensors, control systems (such as 
SCADA) and the power control system. The 
communication layer consists of WAN, NAN (field area 
network), HAN/BAN. Finally, the application layer 
includes power transmission, customer application, and 
real-time pricing.  
The application layer can generally be categorized into 
customer-side applications and grid-side applications. It 
provides smart grid applications for customers (such as 
information of energy usage or real-time pricing, critical 
peak pricing, automated controls for appliances and smart 
devices) and for utility provider (such as substation 
monitoring, fault detection, integrated volt-VAR control 
[80]). 
The communication layer provides a network for the 
transport of data and information in a two-way, efficient, 
reliable and secure manner between the power systems 
and the data centre. As part of the communication layer, 
the HAN is initially a multi-supplier environment 
composed of smart appliances that need to be set-up 
together continuously using suitable standards such as 
ZigBee and HomePlug NANs are employed for covering 
large geographical areas and distributed field devices. 
Typically, NANs use Wi-MAX (Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access) or 3G/4G based 
for wide range communication. Table 1 presents a 
comparison of different communication protocols and 
standards. 
The WAN performs as the core network. It consists of 
the backbone network and the backhaul network. In the 
WAN, the backbone network connects the utility 
backbone and substation to provide high capacity 
communication with minimal latency and commonly uses 
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optical fibres. To provide broadband connectivity to the 
NAN, the backhaul network is the link between the WAN 
and the NAN. In addition, it is connected distribution 
systems such as sensors, SCADA, remote terminal units 
(RTU) and mobile workforces. The main task of the WAN 
is to transport the smart grid’s data to distant sites in an 
efficient and reliable way. Utility control centres have 
been operating WANs and manage the operations and 
processes in the grid for many application such as grid 
monitoring and SCADA [23]. 
Table 1. Different Communication Technologies in a Smart Grid 
Technology Application Data Rates Approx. Coverage 
ZigBee Used for HAN, home appliances and AMI 250 kbps 10 to 100 m 
HomePlug It is a power line uses for electricity wiring to communicate in HAN [21] 14 Mbps 200 Mbps 300 m 
WiMAX Demand response, AMI/wireless automatic meter reading (WAMR) 75 Mbps 50 Km 
Cellular 
G3-PLC 
SCADA and controlling for RTUsAMI, Demand response, monitoring for 





Satellite AMI, WAN 450 Kbps Depend on number of satellites and their beams 
2.4. Efficiency and Reliability 
The future smart grid requires meeting the increasing 
efficiency requirement using and advanced 
communication infrastructure. Information technologies 
enable smart grids to provide grid-wide remote monitoring 
and control capabilities, which go beyond the ability of the 
traditional infrastructure. Moreover, smart grids provide 
high-performance two-way communication with fast 
controls and enable fast automated control actions for 
voltage and power flow management [19]. Furthermore, 
there is a fault tolerance requirement as smart grid nodes 
are often deployed in inhospitable environments. To 
achieve increased efficiency, it is essential for smart grids 
to meet the need for fault-tolerance and that they have the 
ability to deliver the desired level of functionality in the 
occurrence of faults. 
The reliability of power distribution systems and 
transmission systems are critically significant for utilities 
and customers. A distributing power generation facilities 
at various points within the power grid, and creating sub 
grids within larger grids, improves the overall reliability.  
2.5. The Challenges of Big Data and 
Integration  
The smart grid deals with data from a huge number of 
devices in the field and HAN. The data collected from 
smart appliances; smart meters are very important for 
utility companies to obtain information about their power 
system such as voltage levels, energy usage and so on. 
However, handling, and integrating such huge 
interconnected data for analysis is a really challenging and 
complex task that needs to be addressed in other to 
achieve trusted and reliable data. Smart grid will force 
power providers to process far more information than they 
are accustomed to handling [24]. Consequently, in the 
following section, a background survey of research into 
the challenges posed by the integration of big data and 
smart grid issues is presented.  
3. Related Work  
There have been many research and survey papers on 
smart grid networks [2,25-32]. This section presents a 
discussion on the literature survey conducted into the 
related research.  
3.1. Smart Grid Networks 
The authors of [2] focus on conduct of communication 
and reviews networking technologies, including 
communication/networking architectures, control and 
management of operations and QoS and optimization in 
the smart grid. The work in [25] reviews and classifies 
various routing protocols of smart grid applications 
perspectives found in the literature. In this survey, the 
authors have also identified routing design issues for 
smart grids.  
[26] provides the current status of smart meters and 
outlines various issues and challenges involved in the 
design, deployment, utilization, and maintenance of smart 
meter infrastructure. Furthermore, the authors have 
discussed in detail numerous of validate the expectation of 
an empirical method in papers using case studies to 
simulate or conduct pilot runs of the technologies before 
their massive implementations. Strategies are generally 
driven by the United States, while other countries are 
focusing on quality improvements of the already 
strategized initiatives with an efficiency-related goal taken 
into account. The user is going to play an important role in 
the future of smart grids as they are involved in improving 
the business model with the addition of self-generation 
and selling-back of any extra capacity to the utility 
company. 
[28] presents a comprehensive survey of cyber security 
issues for smart grids. In detail, their focus is on reviewing 
and discussing security requirements, security weaknesses, 
and attack countermeasures; secure communication 
networking protocols and architectures in smart grids. In 
addition, they summarized the design of secure network 
protocols to achieve efficient and secure information 
delivery in smart grids. 
[29] provides a general idea of smart grids and current 
advances in distributed sensing, modelling, and control, 
particularly at both the high-voltage smart grid and at the 
consumer level. The advances will pave way for the 
development of an effective, distributed control, and 
intelligent power system networks with a focus on 
addressing computation-distributed sensing, controls, 
dynamic system challenges and opportunities in the future. 
The authors of [30] discussed contents, development, 
and key technologies of wide-area protection. For 
improved availability of data synchronization or 
timeliness, and communication technologies applied in 
smart grids, they can provide high-precision synchronous 
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data acquisition, meet real-time reliability of data 
transmission, and provide basic support for wide-area 
protection principles and applications. There seems to be 
likely for wide-area protection to association with 
adaptive protection, such as IEC61850 protocol or multi-
agent technology. Currently, secure WAN is a research 
gap in smart grids, however, significant improvement has 
already been achieved. 
Authors, in [32], present a survey that provides a 
critical overview in communication, networking and the 
role that smart grid and middleware technologies will have 
in the transformation of existing electric power systems 
into smart grids. This paper presents detailed key 
technological, economic and societal drivers for the 
growth of smart grids. The authors of this work present a 
conceptual model of communication systems for smart 
grids and from the data-centric perspective, many smart 
grid applications can be described as operations where a 
subset of data is consumed within a definite specified time 
or temporal locality. This work briefly identifies 
functional components, communication topologies and 
communication services that are needed to support. The 
authors introduce the major research challenges in this 
area including network reliability, QoS, time 
synchronization, data management and autonomic 
behaviours. 
As summarized in the above research, none of these 
survey and research works focuses on the theoretical and 
practical challenges of management of cryptographic key 
protocols by considering securing major smart grid 
components.  
3.2. Security Challenges in Smart Grid 
Security challenges are one of the main considerations 
that should be addressed for smart grids. Is includes 
situations where malicious users and attackers can modify 
customers’ data or cause any type of attack on an 
unsecured smart grid network. Therefore, we should take 
into account the following security requirements and 
challenges in smart grids. In this section, a general and 
brief review of security requirements in smart grids will 
be presented including availability, data confidentiality, 
data integrity and authentication, as well as cryptographic 
issues, key management, availability, secure routing.  
3.2.1. Data Confidentiality 
In order to secure smart grid data from hackers, it is 
important to protect the confidentiality of smart grid data 
and make sure that data are not changed or lost. Only 
authorized entities should be given access to the data to 
ensure the level of security is high. The best way to 
achieve confidentiality in the smart grid is by encrypting 
data and establishing a shared secret key among nodes. 
This is a standard method and relies on a shared secret key 
to exist between communicating parties. However, 
encryption itself is not effective enough because a 
malicious attacker can perform traffic analysis on the 
overheard cipher text, which could release sensitive 
information from the data. Moreover, to avoid the 
exploitation of information and confidentiality of sent data 
in smart grids, access control policies must also be applied 
[33]. 
Furthermore, to maintain the confidentiality in smart 
grids, secure channels should be built into the network. 
Also, public node information, such as identities, must be 
encrypted to some extent to defend against traffic analysis 
attacks [33]. Compromising a node physically becomes a 
problem of data confidentiality, whereas, a malicious user 
physically captures a node, it is generally expected that the 
adversary can obtain all data from that node such as 
reading meter data or customers’ data. 
3.2.2. Availability 
One of the primary aims of security is the availability of 
data on the entire network. It is a requirement that nodes 
on a smart grid network should be functional throughout 
their lifetime. The best way to achieve this is to have 
network management and supervision by implementing a 
reliable and suitable transport layer solution. Therefore, 
resources in nodes should be available throughout the 
whole network.  
Nodes should have the capability to self-heal to 
mitigate for failure. For example, in the case where power 
to the node is lost, nodes need to reorganize themselves to 
maintain availability [34]. An attack that results in failure 
of availability is known as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attack. It takes place when a system denies service to 
authorized nodes. This may be caused due to resource 
exhaustion by unauthorized nodes. DoS are a real 
challenge for the smart grid.  
Additionally, it is difficult to stop an on-going attack 
since the victim and its nodes may not catch the attack. In 
this kind of attack, the attacker prevents legal users from 
having access to information and services by targeting the 
victim’s device and the network connection. This attack 
stops the user from making outgoing connections on the 
smart grid. Jamming is one of the DoS attacks which 
targets wireless communication frequencies in the smart 
grid [35]. When they are in close range, large amounts of 
noise may be generated in these appliances. The 
communication can be jammed so as to make the signal 
noise very low, and this could lead to the non-functioning 
of the smart grid [36]. Loss of availability may have a 
serious effect in some smart grid components such as the 
controlling system. Loss of availability may impact the 
operation of many critical real-time applications in the 
smart grid such as those in the DR.  
3.2.3. Access Control and Security Policies 
It is important to ensure that data transmitted via smart 
grids is kept confidential and that no one but the intended 
receiver is able to see the message. In addition, smart grids 
contain many components that are interconnected [37]. 
Because of security concerns related to this, authentication 
is needed to verify the identity of the receiver in order to 
avoid any disruption or exploitation [38]. Access to the 
control centre, transmission and distribution grids is 
allowed only for authenticated users, groups and services 
[39]. Furthermore, it is necessity for suitable security 
policies to establish relationships among consumers, 
utilities and third parties, although applying security and 
privacy policies should not result in unsatisfactory 
latencies. Information security policies define the guiding 
rules that security controls are applied to secure data; 
communication routing, processes and systems. In various 
cases, the information and network protection policies 
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used by utilities need to be updated [40]. Smart grid 
provides many benefits to consumers such as control and 
transparency over their energy usage. For example smart 
grid allow consumer to login into their electric account 
and view their energy usage based on data reported from 
their smart meter and it allows receiving alerts based on 
outages by the preferred communication channel and so 
on [11]. However, to realize these advantages there will be 
a need to utilize personal data and smart grid will collect 
personal data. Despite advantages, privacy concerns pose 
challenges. The effect on privacy may allow unwanted 
parties to know of activities on the property. There are 
concerns from consumer about smart meter, which allow 
unpermitted third parties to easily obtain personal 
information. Therefore, it is important to consider privacy 
controls, security and privacy assessment for smart grid. 
In other to address this privacy concerns, several 
research has being carried out such as the one by Li et al 
[70]. In their work, it was pointed out that Power usage 
and operational data can be abused to infer personal 
information of customers. Without a well-designed 
privacy preservation mechanism, adversaries can capture, 
model and divulge customers’ behaviour and activities. 
This led them to first investigate the natures of privacy 
leakages and explore potential privacy threat models. 
After that, they designed and implemented a new protocol 
named privacy reserving demand response based on the 
attributed-based encryption, and formally proved its 
validity. To demonstrate its viability, the protocol was 
adopted in several types of DR programs on an emulated 
smart grid platform. Experimental results show 
substantially lighter overheads while formidable privacy 
challenges are addressed. 
3.2.4. Cryptographic and Key Management Challenges 
Cryptographic mechanisms are one of the best ways to 
achieve confidentiality and provide protection for data 
among smart grids. However, the suitable management of 
keys is necessary for the effective use of cryptography for 
protection. Smart grid consists of heterogeneous 
communication network. Therefore, key management is 
particularly challenging in smart grid, and it is not 
practical to design a universal key management scheme 
for the entire smart grid. Keys are analogous to the 
combination of a safe. If the combination is known by an 
adversary, the strongest safe provides no security against 
penetration [41]. However, weak key management may 
easily compromise strong algorithms. Furthermore, it can 
be time and cost consuming if it is not handled correctly. 
Managing keys in a proper manner could cause additional 
storage and bandwidth usage. Therefore, the security of 
information protected by cryptography directly depends 
on the strength of the keys, the effectiveness of 
mechanisms and protocols associated with the keys, and 
the protection the keys provide [41].  
4. Cryptography Key Management 
In smart grids, communications can be monitored and 
nodes are potentially subject to capture and surreptitious 
use by an adversary. For example, an attacker can modify 
customers’ data or cause any type of attack for an 
unsecured smart grid network. For that reason, 
cryptographically secure communications are required.  
Cryptography is used as a protection technique to 
provide confidentiality, authentication, data integrity and 
non-repudiation in smart grid communication. A number 
of different approaches have been used for cryptography 
such as hash functions. 
4.1. Cryptography Research 
In cryptography, the most crucial and challenging step 
is Key management [42]. Key management is critical and 
to obtain good security the keys' length should be long 
enough to reach the security requirement in the smart grid 
communication. Furthermore, the key’s lifetime should fit 
with the security requirement [43]. A keying relationship 
can be used to facilitate cryptographic mechanisms in 
smart grid communication. 
Cryptographic techniques make use of two types of 
keys, either symmetric or asymmetric. Symmetric 
cryptography relies on a shared secret key between two 
nodes to enable secure communication. Asymmetric 
cryptography, applies two different keys, a private key and 
a public key. The public key is used for encryption and 
can be published. The private key is used for decryption. 
From a computational point of view asymmetric 
cryptography requires orders of magnitude more resources 
than symmetric cryptography. In general, key 
management is considered of four sorts of keys as 
following: one-time session symmetric keys, public keys, 
private keys, passphrase-based symmetric keys. 
The session keys are used once and generated for each 
new message. The public keys are used in asymmetric 
encryption. On the other hand, private keys are also used 
in asymmetric encryption. Passphrase-based keys are used 
to protect private keys. A single node can have multiple 
public or private key pairs [43]. 
4.2. Key Management in the Smart Grid  
The smart grid contains heterogeneous communication 
networks, including small-scale (e.g., a substation system) 
and large-scale (e.g., the AMI system) networks, wireless 
and wire-line networks. It is not practical to design a 
single key management infrastructure to generate and 
distribute keys for all networks in the smart grid. 
Moreover, key management on a smart grid is to be 
performed and protected on its communications networks 
among various parties such as a smart meter, AMI, 
sensors, IED and SCADA. Therefore, it is not practical to 
design a single key management infrastructure to generate 
and distribute keys for all systems and parties in the smart 
grid. Furthermore, it is important to consider the security 
requirements of various systems in the smart grid for 
chosen key management schemes [44]. 
Many approaches have been proposed so far to 
implement a key management system for smart grids. In 
order to understand the key management issues and 
inconveniences for smart grids, we first need to review 
and compare these recently proposed approaches and 
architectures aimed at distributing and managing 
authenticated keys for smart grid systems. We have 
classified key management schemes in smart grid 
networks as follows. 
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4.2.1. Key Management for AMI  
The writers in [19] proposed key management for an 
AMI system which is built based on the key graph. They 
define the secure exchange between a Management Side 
(MS) (e.g., utility) and appliance or devices (SX) at the 
customer premise (i.e., smart meters). There are three 
different key management processes proposed in KMF to 
deal with the hybrid transmission modes; the contents of 
key management for unicast, broadcast, and multicast 
modes. Relatively simple cryptographic algorithms are 
chosen for key generation and refreshing policies due to 
the storage and computation constraints of SMs. The KMF 
has been defined as KMF = (U, K, R) where U nodes in 
the AMI system; K denote keys of nodes, gk is group of 
keys and R is the binary relation between U and K, 
therefore, useru knows key k if and only if (u, k) is in R. 
Furthermore, user set k = {u|(u, k) ∈ R}. In the proposed 
scheme, the root key k0 is used for broadcast; the group 
keys {gk1, gk2, .., gkm} are used for multicast in different 
DR project groups; the keys {k1, k2, . . . , kn} are used for 
unicast communication between management side MS and 
each devices SX. The proposed KMS is closely integrated 
and supports the unicast, broadcast, and multicast. The 
distribution of the keys and related data will not affect the 
normal network traffic in an AMI system. Moreover, the 
proposed scheme can deal with normal security attacks. 
Furthermore, forward and backward security is dealt with 
in the proposed scheme. The authors of [19] apply the 
hierarchy of keys or a rooted tree, therefore, every user is 
given a subset of keys which contains its individual key, a 
key for the entire group for group communications, and a 
key for its subgroup. However, the proposed scheme 
requires updating the key redistribution for each joining or 
leaving of the session. Furthermore, the network topology 
has not been taken into account, which will cause some 
unwanted nodes in a group to receive rekey messages. 
The authors in [45] propose a lightweight key 
distribution and management scheme tailored to AMI. 
Specifically, a group ID-based mechanism is proposed to 
establish the keys for a large amount of entities with a 
small overhead. They propose a group identifier-based 
mechanism to establish the symmetric keys, in which a 
gateway shares a different secret key with every single 
smart meter and the keys are generated based on the D-H 
algorithm; however, without authenticating the smart 
meters during the key generation phase. Moreover, they 
add a verification step to the pair wise key construction. 
Since the proposed scheme requires every single meter to have 
a symmetric key, it is not scalable for smart grids. Moreover, 
use of symmetric keys is vulnerable to MITM attack.  
Subir et al., in [46], proposed a unified key 
management mechanism (UKMF) that can generate 
ciphering keys for multiple protocols of multiple 
communication layers from a single peer entity 
authentication procedure. The unified key management 
mechanism is suitable for smart grid use cases, especially 
for smart metering, where smart meters are assumed to be 
low-cost wireless devices for which repeated peer entity 
authentication attempts for each protocol can be 
contributed to increased system overhead. The proposed 
mechanism is flexible in that peer entity authentication 
can be treated as either network access authentication or 
application-level authentication. However, the mechanism 
has established that information discovery for bootstrap 
application ciphering is an important and as yet missing 
piece to realize the unified key management framework 
vision. This part needs further analysis. 
4.2.2. Key Management for SCADA 
Sungjin et al. [47] proposed a key management scheme 
that address the broadcasting and multicasting 
communication in SCADA system. The proposed scheme 
uses a Iolus framework [48] as an underlying architecture, 
which is based on hierarchy of nodes. The hierarchy 
provides a structure of managed and manager nodes; to 
manage a protected distribution tree where every node is 
managed through a subgroup manager. Through the Iolus 
framework, the key structure is divided into two types, 
which are between master terminal unit MTU and SUB-
MTUs and between SUB-MTUs and RTUs. Each type has 
a separate controller. One is responsible for the top-level 
management, which is called the Group Security 
Controller (GSC).  
The second level is responsible for the rest of the 
subgroups, called Group Security Intermediary (GSI). The 
secret group key is shared between GSIs with GSC, 
whereas every node subgroup key is shared with every 
node of GSI. Therefore, a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) 
structure is used to manage keys. The use of Iolus’s 
hierarchy provides the ability of multicasting and 
broadcasting for multiple RTUs. Furthermore, it also helps 
to minimize the number of keys to be stored. However, the 
scheme provides limited multicasting. In addition, it 
generates increased number of keys that are stored in 
RTUs, which incurs more computational overhead. 
To address the scalability issue in key management 
solutions, Wong et al. [49] proposed the logical key 
hierarchy protocol, which is based on constructing a 
logical tree of keys. From its leaf to the root, every node 
shares symmetric keys. Whenever a member wants to 
join/leave the session, all the symmetric keys are revised 
in the tree. The proposed key management scheme is 
scalable; however, the main drawback of the scheme is 
that the keys are hashed rather than encrypted and 
distributed if a new member joins the session [50]. Choi et 
al. [51] proposed a key management scheme named as 
Advanced Key Management Architecture (ASKMA), for 
message broadcasting and secure communications. Their 
scheme performs well and minimizes the burden on low 
power nodes. Their scheme uses a logical key hierarchy. 
The scheme has many benefits; however, it may be less 
efficient during the multicast communication process. 
Another issue for ASKMA is its lack of availability, that 
is, the continuity of the security processes when there is a 
node failure or when a new node joins in. 
Choi et al. [50] proposed ASKMA+, an improvement to 
ASKMA. This new scheme reduces the number of stored 
keys and provides efficient and protected multicast and 
broadcast communications. However, the availability 
issue of ASKMA+ is still not resolved.  
National Laboratories proposed the SKE (Secure Key 
Establishment) scheme to secure SCADA system. SKE 
started with classifying the keys exchange on the SCADA 
network into two parts [52]. The first is Controller-to-
Subordinate (C-S) MTU-RTU, and SUB-MTU-RTU 
which uses symmetric keys. The second classification is a 
Subordinate-to-Subordinate (S-S) communication, which 
works as a peer-to-peer communications using public key 
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cryptography. However, SKE cannot support RTU-to-
RTU communications. Broadcast and multicast scenarios 
are also not supported by SKE.  
4.2.3. Key Management for vehicle-to-grid (V2G) 
The idea of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) is that electric 
vehicles (EVs) communicate with the smart grid to sell 
demand response services by delivering electricity into the 
grid. The operation of V2G networks is based on 
continuously monitoring the status of individual EVs as 
well as a designed incentive scheme to attract sufficient 
participating EVs.  
Authors of [53] have proposed V2G communication 
protocol with privacy preservation. They propose a secure 
and privacy-preserving communication protocol for V2G 
networks, which utilizes the restrictive partially blind 
signature to protect the identities of the EV owners and is 
also based on certificate less public key cryptography to 
simplify the certificate management as in traditional 
public key infrastructure and to overcome the key escrow 
problem as in identity-based public key cryptography. The 
proposed protocol can achieve the properties of 
completeness, identity and location privacy, 
confidentiality and integrity of the communications, and 
known-key security, and is secure against the replay 
attacks and existential adaptively chosen message attacks 
[53]. 
4.2.4. Key Management for WSNs 
LEAP [54] is Key Management protocol. It aims to 
increase the protection of non-security protocols. It 
supports 4 kinds of keys to each node. One node is shared 
with the base station, which contains individual keys. 
Then pair-wise keys are shared with nearby nodes. Cluster 
keys are shared with a set of nearby nodes. Finally, one 
key is shared with all nodes in the network, which is a 
group key. LEAP supports a protocol to authenticate local 
broadcast. Furthermore, it supports in-network processing 
for its key sharing. Therefore, it sufficiently protects the 
sensor networks from many security attacks. Finally, the 
LEAP scheme is effective for key creation and key 
updating while maintaining the necessity of small storage 
for each node. 
5. Key Management and Security for 
AMI  
Nicanfar et al., propose using a CA as a Security 
Associate (SA) server in the utility network [55]. Their 
system has two secret values with the SA keeping the first 
secret (the main part) and smart meters keeping the second 
secret value, which is only a counter generated by SA and 
it is part of the system secret values managed by SA). The 
authors do not consider the security issues when 
appliances are installed in the SM perimeter and focus 
instead on the security between the SM and the utility. 
To minimize public key and private key management 
network overheads, the authors propose an ID-based 
cryptography model along with a one-way hash function 
applied to each node ID to provide the public key of the 
node. According to [72], the SA and a new SM are 
mutually authenticated during the synchronization phase 
of the new SM. The new SM chooses a previously 
initialized node (Authentication Agent (AG)) for this step. 
During this step, the SM’s private key is sent by the SA 
after computing both the SA’s and the AG’s public keys 
and after several symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
operations by the involved entities. The benefits of 
involving AG in the middle of communications between a 
new SM and the SA are not clear and b) the way to detect 
if an AG has been compromised is also not discussed in 
detail. Moreover, the synchronization phase could be 
achieved offline (during the factory or site acceptance 
tests) thereby reducing the computational overheads 
associated with this approach. 
A Distribution grid management, which focuses on 
improving the performance of various feeders and 
transformers, by having a networked distribution system, 
which can integrate transmission systems with the needs 
of customer management. The different Smart Grid 
capabilities are needed in order to ensure that AMI and 
other systems can be developed in order to ensure that 
various systems can lead to improvement in the grid 
management systems. One of the factor which is 
important to consider that efficient and reliable systems 
can lead to power systems which can reduce the peak 
loads, and improve the capabilities of the smart grind in 
managing the different renewable energy source. This will 
also ensure that improvement in the systems can be 
managed in order to create a competitive advantage for the 
company who may be using such a grid system. 
In their research [66], the authors develop a secure and 
lightweight scalable security protocol that allows a power 
system operator (PO) to collect data from measurement 
devices (MDs) using data collectors (DCs). The security 
protocol trades off between computations and device 
memory requirements and provides flexible association 
between DC and MDs. These features allow data to be 
securely transferred from MDs to POs via mobile or 
untrustworthy DCs. The complexity and security of the 
protocols is analysed so as to validate its performance 
using experiments. The results confirm that the proposed 
protocol collects data in a secure, fast and efficient manner. 
In this work, the authors propose and analyse a key 
establishment and data collection protocol, SELINDA, 
which allows a PO to establish shared keys with multiple 
MDs via an untrusted DC. The DC behaves like a relay for 
data communications although it is not continuously 
connected to the PO. Besides, the DC has no access to the 
keys established between the PO and the MDs. Therefore, 
the DC can potentially be mobile and untrusted, which 
makes the scheme essential for ensuring the security of 
community aided data collection in the smart grid. 
The protocol has four key features that distinguish it 
from existing protocols. First, the protocol is 
computationally lightweight for the MDs as it requires the 
MDs to perform very few expensive cryptographic 
operations and to send few messages. Thus the protocol 
supports resource constrained MDs with limited memory 
and a slow CPU. Second, the protocol allows to trade off 
computation for memory requirements in the MDs. There 
is one long-term secret per entity, its private key. Thus, 
the PO needs to maintain the public key of all MDs in the 
system. It also maintains state information for the current 
session of data collection. The MD only needs to 
remember its own private key and the public key of the 
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PO. They can recalculate or store the session keys, 
depending on their computational and memory constraints. 
Third, the protocol provides flexible association between 
DCs and MDs. As an MD does not need to know the 
public key of any DC, the PO can assign different DCs to 
collect data from the same MD at different times. This 
feature is particularly important in scenarios where the 
DCs are mobile or the infrastructure is evolving so that 
different mappings or assignments between DCs and MDs 
can be used at different times after the deployment of the 
MDs. Finally, the protocol protects the collected data from 
a compromised DC. Thus, an attacker cannot access the 
collected data even if it is in control of a DC. This allows 
the PO to outsource the data collection procedure without 
sacrificing security. 
In [67], the authors introduce a cryptographic key 
management mechanism for secure and efficient key 
revocation and exchange. The scheme is based upon a 
well-known cryptographic protocol: Broadcast encryption 
using a media key block (MKB). In comparison with the 
individual identification process in the PKI-signature 
based IKE protocol, this approach is more efficient. In the 
IKE scheme, each device need to verify signatures in the 
certificate and CRL for each device before each 
communication starts, whereas this proposed scheme only 
requires each device to perform an MKB process to 
extract the media key (or, shared key) which contains one 
signature verification at the system's setup step. 
MKB to all devices in the same management area as 
proposed is more efficient than the PKI based scheme, 
which need to distribute individual certificate for each 
device. The comparison results show that in most cases 
this proposed scheme is efficient and cost-effective for 
power devices and systems in the smart grid. Similarly, in 
[68], an efficient group key (GK) management scheme 
aimed at securing the group communications, for instance, 
from the utility to appliances and smart meters located in 
different homes is presented. The scheme is based on the 
X.1035 password-authenticated key exchange protocol 
standard and also follows the cluster-based approach to 
reduce the costs of the GK construction and maintenance 
for large groups. The protocol enables secure 
communications utilizing any communication technology. 
Analysis using one of the best evaluation tools in the 
technical community shows that the constructed GK is 
valid and secure against well-known attacks. They also 
show that the proposed scheme supports forward and 
backward secrecy and is more efficient in comparison 
with other GK mechanisms. 
They propose the password authenticated cluster-based 
GK agreement (PACGKA) protocols to manage the 
security of group communication in Smart grid to support 
multiparty applications. PACGKA extends the password-
authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol to construct 
and manage a GK among a cluster of devices, utilizing a 
pre-shared password for authentication. We show that key 
management using PACGKA is more efficient than 
existing methods without sacrificing security 
6. User Privacy in Smart Grid 
The authors of [69], proposes a privacy-preserving 
aggregation (PARK) scheme with adaptive key 
management and revocation like in [67], to prevent user’s 
data from being disclosed to untrusted entities in smart 
grid. Specifically, they first investigate a lightweight 
aggregation scheme with efficient aggregate 
authentication, which protects the individual user’s data 
from disclosure to the untrusted aggregator. Furthermore, 
a proposal for an adaptive key management mechanism 
with effective revocation, where users can automatically 
update their encryption keys if no user joins or departs 
from the system. The expiry time of the key is determined 
by user’s reputation for the adaptive key management. 
Finally, the security analysis demonstrates that the PARK 
can achieve privacy preservation, forward and backward 
secrecy at the same time, while the performance 
evaluation shows that the PARK consumes reasonable 
costs.  
In [71], the authors propose a group ID-based 
mechanism to establish the keys for a large number of 
entities as we expect in the smart grid environment with 
many home users. A multiplicative group *q Z (qis a 
prime number) is used to generate secret keys as thus; 
Every device securely accesses a Certification Authority 
(CA) which issues certificates each of which is loaded 
with the following primitives: the device Identifier (ID) 
(serial number), the multiplicative group parameters (*q Z, 
q, a), where a primitive root of q, and H (the hash 
function). According to this approach, the gateway GW 
(e.g., HEG) and each neighboring device X (e.g., smart 
meter and appliances) selects a random number in the 
multiplicative group and generates its public key (e.g. X 
selects x and computes ax). 
Then a group key is generated and shared between a 
gateway GW and a group of N devices (X1, X2… XN) in 
the HAN as follows: first, GW and each device Xi use the 
unauthenticated group key to generate Xi GW K based on 
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange method. Then GW 
will aggregate all the symmetric keys to compute the 
common group key Gk, which is the multiplication of the 
aggregated keys. Finally, GW sends Gk to every device Xi 
after encrypting it using Xi GW K. The authors claim that 
their approach provides forward secrecy (i.e., if the secret 
material is compromised, an attacker should not be able to 
decrypt messages that were previously encrypted by that 
key material). However, if the secret is compromised, an 
attacker will be able to decrypt every message intercepted 
before the Key update. Due to the DH deployment, 
frequently updating the keys make this approach to be 
computationally very expensive. Moreover, the gateway is 
a single point of failure in the architecture. This approach 
only protects the messages being exchanged between 
HAN devices and the gateway. 
Kamto et al [72] propose a framework for key 
distribution and management for both aggregation and 
accountability in a neighbourhood area network employed 
by a utility company in its power distribution system. 
Specifically, a key distribution table is set up for each 
smart meter to carry out homomorphic encryption for 
secure data aggregation, while a loose time synchronized 
key scheme is proposed for low rate data collection of 
each smart meter. Specifically, a secure pair-wise key 
agreement scheme is designed to provide the authenticity 
of the end user in a wireless mesh network configuration 
of SMs. This scheme works in concert with the 
homomorphic encryption to provide the utility company 
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with the real-time bulk power demand while keeping the 
end user’s power usage a secret during the distributed 
aggregation. Furthermore, they propose a loose time 
synchronized key mechanism for secure collection of 
relatively slow paced readings of power consumption 
recorded by each individual meter and allocate each end-
user’s individual power demand necessary for accurate 
power usage billing and potential Cheaters and attacks 
identification. 
Seo et al [73], in this paper, propose an efficient 
encryption key management mechanism for end-to-end 
security in the AMI. By applying certificate-less public 
key cryptography (CL-PKC) for smart meter key 
management, the approach eliminates certificate 
management overhead at the utility. Moreover, our 
mechanism is practical, because it does not require any 
extra hardware for authentication of the smart meters. In 
this approach, the utility supports a PKI and has its own 
public key certificate, but smart meters are not required to 
have certificates. Instead of using certificates for the smart 
meters, the concept of CL-PKC to generate and manage 
the keys of the smart meters is utilized. Unlike the utility, 
which is a static entity, smart meters are dynamic entities 
which often leave or join the AMI. If smart meters are 
required to have certificates, the utility has the burden of 
managing these smart meter’s certificates. 
In CL-PKC, each user’s complete private key is a 
combination of a partial private key generated by a Key 
Generation Centre (KGC) and an additional secret 
generated by the user. The advantage of this approach is 
that the KGC is not prone to the problem of key escrow, 
because the KGC is no longer responsible for the 
complete user private key. Therefore even if the attacker 
compromises the KGC, the attacker cannot obtain the 
private keys of the users. Moreover, the special structure 
of CL-PKC allows a user to encrypt a message without 
having to verify the public key of the message receiver via 
a public key certificate. By utilizing key settings of CL-
PKC for smart meters, the authors eliminate the utility’s 
overhead of certificate management.  
[74] proposes an efficient scheme that mutually 
authenticates a smart meter of a home area network (HAN) 
and an authentication server in the Smart Grid (SG) by 
utilizing an initial password, by decreasing the number of 
steps in the secure remote password protocol from five to 
three and the number of exchanged packets from four to 
three. Furthermore, it proposes an efficient key 
management protocol based on an enhanced identity-
based cryptography for secure SG communications using 
the public key infrastructure. This proposed mechanisms 
are capable of preventing various attacks while reducing 
the management overhead. The improved efficiency for 
key management is realized by periodically refreshing all 
public/ private key pairs as well as any multicast keys in 
all the nodes using only one newly generated function 
broadcasted by the key generator entity. 
[75] proposes to protect sensitive energy usage 
information of consumers by the use of a virtual ring 
architecture that can provide a privacy protection solution 
using symmetric or asymmetric encryptions of customers’ 
requests belonging to the same group. They compare the 
efficiency of the proposed approach with two recently 
proposed smart grid privacy approaches namely, one 
based on blind signature and other based on a 
homomorphic encryption solution [72]. They show that 
this approach maintains the privacy of customers while 
reducing the performance overhead of cryptographic 
computations by more than a factor of 2 when compared 
with the aforementioned past solutions. It is further 
demonstrated that the smart grid privacy solution is simple, 
scalable, cost-effective, and incurs minimal computational 
processing overheads. The proposed solution can support 
both symmetric and asymmetric based authentication 
schemes. Furthermore, they demonstrate that the privacy 
solution is computationally more efficient than two of the 
more recently proposed smart grid privacy solutions and is 
more resilient to a wide range of attacks such as replay, 
known session key and man-in-the middle attacks. 
With large-scale AMI deployments, addressing security 
issues is challenging. In particular, as data travels through 
several networks, secure end-to-end communication based 
on strong authentication mechanisms and a robust and 
scalable key management schemes are crucial for assuring 
the confidentiality and the integrity of this data [76]. The 
authors propose an approach based on PUF (physically 
unclonable function) technology for providing strong 
hardware based authentication of smart meters and 
efficient key management to assure the confidentiality and 
integrity of messages exchanged between smart meters 
and the utility. This approach does not require 
modifications to the existing smart meter communication. 
In this work, the problem of designing a key 
management scheme able to achieve secure end-to-end 
communication in the AMI is addressed. Specifically, 
their solution provides an efficient approach to manage 
keys and a strong authentication mechanism. The solution 
is based on the use of PUF (physically unclonable 
function) devices, which are inexpensive to manufacture 
and provide hardware based strong authentication 
mechanism resistant to spoofing attacks. 
The PUF devices’ hardware is based on one-way 
function to generate and re-generate the symmetric keys 
and access level passwords for smart meters. The PUF 
based secret generation mechanism provides strong 
protection against key leakage, as the master key is never 
stored in memory. PUFs (Physically clonable functions) 
are one-way functions that are embedded in a physical 
structure [77]. A PUF takes an input challenge Ci ∈C, 
where C is the set of all-possible challenges and produces 
a response Ri∈R, where R is the set of all possible 
responses. Mathematically, a PUF can be represented as a 
function PUF: C → R. The function is based on the 
intrinsic randomness that exists in the integrated circuit 
used to generate the response and cannot be controlled. As 
PUF relies on the random variations during the integrated 
circuit fabrication process, even two PUFs with the same 
layout results in two different functions. In other words, it 
is physically impossible to make two PUFs behave 
identically. This PUF device is incorporated in a feedback 
loop for a system-on-chip(SoC) design. The ECU (Error 
Correcting Unit) performs error correction on the PUF 
response with transmission noise so that, in a real setting, 
every time the same challenge is given the PUF along with 
the ECU produces the same response. 
The CC (Cryptographic Core) is a stand-alone hardware 
component that provides cryptographic services to the 
communication board of the smart meter. The operation of 
the CC depends on the required functionality. In this 
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approach, the CC implements a secure hashing, and 
encryption operations for use by smart meters. The 
Reg(register) stores the initial challenge and then later get 
overwritten by the subsequent responses from PUFECU 
component. Notice that PUF-ECU-Reg forms a feedback 
loop. We utilize this feedback mechanism to generate keys 
chaining responses in a sequence. This technique is 
similar to using hash chains to generate one-time keys 
where a cryptographic hash function is applied repeatedly 
to obtain a new key. 
[77], proposes an efficient and scalable key 
management protocol for secure unicast, multicast, and 
broadcast communications in a smart grid network. The 
proposed protocol is based on a binary tree approach, and 
supports all these three types of secure communications by 
using only one binary tree. The analysis and discussion 
show that the proposed protocol is versatile, and hence 
suitable for secure smart grid communications. 
The authors propose an efficient and versatile key 
management protocol for secure smart grid 
communications. The proposed protocol is based on a key 
management protocol for secure broadcast 
communications in pay-tv broadcasting systems. This 
work defines and discusses a new requirement for key 
management in secure smart grid communications. It also 
proposes a key management protocol for secure unicast 
and multicast communications as well as secure broadcast. 
The proposed key management comprises of three 
protocols: the system initialization, the key management 
for secure broadcast communications, and the key 
management for secure unicast/multicast communications 
7. Conclusion 
Cyber security has apparently become an important 
concern globally that needs to be addressed. Smart-grid 
metering and control systems hold vast opportunities for 
improving efficiency, convenience and sustainability of 
electronic data. It is also aimed at providing a scalable, 
pervasive and interactive communication infrastructure 
with new energy management and demand response 
capabilities. Cyber security in the smart-grid metering and 
control system is a crucial and rapidly growing area that 
has drawn attention from governments and various 
industries.  
The study presented considered various key 
management schemes. In general, it is observed that there 
are two approaches taken for the initial authentication with 
the network – using a pre-deployed key or dynamically 
generating a key. Most schemes prefer to use a symmetric 
key and justify its use with the low computing power 
required, the low computing delay and the low storage 
required due to the reduced key length (typically 128 to 
160 bits). However, there are schemes that choose to use 
asymmetric key cryptography, designating an upstream 
server as a trusted CA. Such schemes use asymmetric key 
cryptography for the initial authentication and key 
exchange. A symmetric key is used for encrypting data 
exchanged.  
Schemes that are originally designed for WSNs can be 
effectively implemented for Smart Grid use. However, 
there are certain factors that determine the suitability of a 
specific key management solution. These factors depend 
upon the functional topology of the Smart Grid segment 
where the devices are deployed (i.e., a HAN or a NAN). 
The functional topology, in turn depends upon the data 
flow patterns (i.e., sensor-to-sensor or sensor-to-NOC), 
the direction of the flow, radio range and connectivity 
(single hop vs multi-hop) and the data reliability required. 
This impacts the type of communication that is used to 
distribute the keys – unicast and multicast/broadcast. 
Likewise, the choice of using a unique key per sensor or a 
group key is impacted. Added to these are the limitations 
of the sensor devices in terms of energy use, computing 
capability and memory storage. The various key 
management schemes presented address different aspects 
mentioned above. It is therefore evident that each of the 
schemes are efficient for a specific set of factors and no 
single scheme claims to provide a generic solution, 
deployable across the Smart Grid, efficiently. 
It is to be noted that this survey does not address 
specifically, the various malicious attacks possible on the 
Smart Grid. Therefore, it does not comment on the impact 
of such attacks or the characteristics of various key 
management schemes to be resilient to such attacks. 
Node-capture attacks are expected to cause a high impact 
and have the potential to compromise large portions of the 
network.  
References 
[1] T. Flick and J. Morehouse, Securing the Smart Grid: Next 
Generation Power Grid Security: Elsevier Science, 2010. 
[2] J. Gao, Y. Xiao, J. Liu, W. Liang, and C. L. P. Chen, "A survey of 
communication/networking in Smart Grids," Future Generation 
Computer Systems, vol. 28, pp. 391-404, 2012. 
[3] X. Fang, S. Misra, G. Xue, and D. Yang, "Smart Grid - The New 
and Improved Power Grid: A Survey," Communications Surveys 
& Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 14, pp. 944-980, 2012. 
[4] K. Iniewski, Convergence of Mobile and Stationary Next-
Generation Networks: Wiley, 2011. 
[5] F. Rahimi and A. Ipakchi, "Overview of Demand Response under 
the Smart Grid and Market paradigms," in Innovative Smart Grid 
Technologies (ISGT), 2010, 2010, pp. 1-7. 
[6] P. K. Steimer, "Enabled by high power electronics-Energy 
efficiency, renewables and smart grids," in Power Electronics 
Conference (IPEC), 2010 International, 2010, pp. 11-15. 
[7] N. E. Bassam, P. Maegaard, and M. L. Schlichting, Distributed 
Renewable Energies for Off-grid Communities: Strategies and 
Technologies Toward Achieving Sustainability in Energy 
Generation and Supply: Elsevier, 2013. 
[8] E. D. Knapp and J. Langill, Industrial Network Security: Securing 
Critical Infrastructure Networks for Smart Grid, SCADA, and 
Other Industrial Control Systems: Syngress, 2011. 
[9] N. Kayastha, D. Niyato, E. Hossain, and Z. Han, "Smart grid 
sensor data collection, communication, and networking: a 
tutorial," Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, pp. 
n/a-n/a, 2012. 
[10] J. Weiss, Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic 
Threats: Momentum Press, 2010. 
[11] E. D. Knapp and R. Samani, "Chapter 1-What is the Smart Grid?," 
in Applied Cyber Security and the Smart Grid, ed Boston: 
Syngress, 2013, pp. 1-15. 
[12] R. L. Krutz, Securing SCADA Systems. Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Wiley Publishing, 2006. 
[13] F. Daryabar, A. Dehghantanha, N. I. Udzir, N. F. B. M. Sani, and 
S. bin Shamsuddin, "Towards secure model for SCADA systems," 
in Cyber Security, Cyber Warfare and Digital Forensic 
(CyberSec), 2012 International Conference on, 2012, pp. 60-64. 
[14] S. Nabil and B. Mohamed, "Security solution for semantic 
SCADA optimized by ECC mixed coordinates," in Information 
Technology and e-Services (ICITeS), 2012 International 
Conference on, 2012, pp. 1-6. 
38 Journal of Computer Sciences and Applications  
 
[15] J. A. Zubairi and A. Mahboob, Cyber Security Standards, 
Practices and Industrial Applications: Systems and Methodologies: 
Igi Global, 2011. 
[16] B. Shahid, Z. Ahmed, A. Faroqi, and R. M. Navid-ur-Rehman, 
"Implementation of smart system based on smart grid Smart Meter 
and smart appliances," in Smart Grids (ICSG), 2012 2nd Iranian 
Conference on, 2012, pp. 1-4. 
[17] Fadi Aloula, A. R. Al-Alia , Rami Al-Dalkya, M. Al-Mardinia, 
and a. W. El-Hajjb, "Smart Grid Security: Threats, Vulnerabilities 
and Solutions " International Journal of Smart Grid and Clean 
Energy vol. 1, 2012. 
[18] M. Badra and S. Zeadally, "Key management solutions in the 
smart grid environment," in Wireless and Mobile Networking 
Conference (WMNC), 2013 6th Joint IFIP, 2013, pp. 1-7. 
[19] L. Nian, C. Jinshan, Z. Lin, Z. Jianhua, and H. Yanling, "A Key 
Management Scheme for Secure Communications of Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure in Smart Grid," Industrial Electronics, 
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 60, pp. 4746-4756, 2013. 
[20] S. S. Iyengar and R. R. Brooks, Distributed Sensor Networks, 
Second Edition: Sensor Networking and Applications: Taylor & 
Francis, 2012. 
[21] M. Z. Huq and S. Islam, "Home Area Network technology 
assessment for demand response in smart grid environment," in 
Universities Power Engineering Conference (AUPEC), 2010 20th 
Australasian, 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[22] E. Hossain, Z. Han, and H. V. Poor, Smart Grid Communications 
and Networking: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
[23] L. T. Berger and K. Iniewski, Smart Grid Applications, 
Communications, and Security: Wiley, 2012. 
[24] F. Bouhafs, M. Mackay, and M. Merabti, "Links to the Future: 
Communication Requirements and Challenges in the Smart Grid," 
Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, vol. 10, pp. 24-32, 2012. 
[25] N. Saputro, K. Akkaya, and S. Uludag, "A survey of routing 
protocols for smart grid communications," Computer Networks, 
vol. 56, pp. 2742-2771, 2012. 
[26] S. S. S. R. Depuru, L. Wang, and V. Devabhaktuni, "Smart meters 
for power grid: Challenges, issues, advantages and status," 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 15, pp. 2736-
2742, 2011. 
[27] J. A. Cardenas, L. Gemoets, J. H. Ablanedo Rosas, and R. Sarfi, 
"A literature survey on Smart Grid distribution: an analytical 
approach," Journal of Cleaner Production. 
[28] W. Wang and Z. Lu, "Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey 
and challenges," Computer Networks, vol. 57, pp. 1344-1371, 
2013. 
[29] S. Massoud Amin, "Smart Grid: Overview, Issues and 
Opportunities. Advances and Challenges in Sensing, Modeling, 
Simulation, Optimization and Control," European Journal of 
Control, vol. 17, pp. 547-567, 2011. 
[30] L. Luo, N. Tai, and G. Yang, "Wide-area Protection Research in 
the Smart Grid," Energy Procedia, vol. 16, Part C, pp. 1601-1606, 
2012. 
[31] M. Fadaeenejad, A. M. Saberian, M. Fadaee, M. A. M. Radzi, H. 
Hizam, and M. Z. A. AbKadir, "The present and future of smart 
power grid in developing countries," Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, vol. 29, pp. 828-834, 2014. 
[32] E. Ancillotti, R. Bruno, and M. Conti, "The role of communication 
systems in smart grids: Architectures, technical solutions and 
research challenges," Computer Communications. 
[33] P. Stavroulakis and M. Stamp, Handbook of Information and 
Communication Security: Springer, 2010. 
[34] Z. Zhang, H. Liu, S. Niu, and J. Mo, "Information security 
requirements and challenges in smart grid," in Information 
Technology and Artificial Intelligence Conference (ITAIC), 2011 
6th IEEE Joint International, 2011, pp. 90-92. 
[35] L. Husheng, L. Lifeng, and R. C. Qiu, "A denial-of-service 
jamming game for remote state monitoring in smart grid," in 
Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 2011 45th Annual 
Conference on, 2011, pp. 1-6. 
[36] L. Zhuo, W. Wenye, and C. Wang, "Hiding traffic with 
camouflage: Minimizing message delay in the smart grid under 
jamming," in INFOCOM, 2012 Proceedings IEEE, 2012, pp. 
3066-3070. 
[37] S. Ruj and A. Nayak, "A Decentralized Security Framework for 
Data Aggregation and Access Control in Smart Grids," Smart Grid, 
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 4, pp. 196-205, 2013. 
[38] M. Jung, T. Hofer, S. Dobelt, G. Kienesberger, F. Judex, and W. 
Kastner, "Access control for a Smart Grid SOA," in Internet 
Technology And Secured Transactions, 2012 International 
Conferece For, 2012, pp. 281-287. 
[39] M. B. Line, I. A. Tondel, and M. G. Jaatun, "Cyber security 
challenges in Smart Grids," in Innovative Smart Grid 
Technologies (ISGT Europe), 2011 2nd IEEE PES International 
Conference and Exhibition on, 2011, pp. 1-8. 
[40] E. Pallotti and F. Mangiatordi, "Smart grid cyber security 
requirements," in Environment and Electrical Engineering 
(EEEIC), 2011 10th International Conference on, 2011, pp. 1-4. 
[41] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and 
Practice, International Edition: Principles and Practice: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2014. 
[42] Alfred J. Menezes, P. C. v. Oorschot, and a. S. A. Vanstone, 
Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 1996. 
[43] H. R. Nemati and L. Yang, Applied Cryptography for Cyber 
Security and Defense: Information Encryption and Cyphering: 
Information Science Reference, 2011. 
[44] W. Wang and Z. Lu, "Survey Cyber security in the Smart Grid: 
Survey and challenges," Comput. Netw., vol. 57, pp. 1344-1371, 
2013. 
[45] J. Kamto, Q. Lijun, J. Fuller, and J. Attia, "Light-weight key 
distribution and management for Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure," in GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps), 2011 
IEEE, 2011, pp. 1216-1220. 
[46] S. Das, Y. Ohba, M. Kanda, D. Famolari, and S. K. Das, "A key 
management framework for AMI networks in smart grid," 
Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 50, pp. 30-37, 2012. 
[47] Sungjin Lee, Donghyun Choi, a. Choonsik Park, and S. Kim, "An 
Efficient Key Management Scheme for Secure SCADA 
Communication," World Academy of Science, Engineering and 
Technology, vol. 45, 2008. 
[48] S. Mittra, "Iolus: a framework for scalable secure multicasting," 
presented at the Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '97 
conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and 
protocols for computer communication, Cannes, France, 1997. 
[49] W. Chung Kei, M. Gouda, and S. S. Lam, "Secure group 
communications using key graphs," Networking, IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on, vol. 8, pp. 16-30, 2000. 
[50] C. Donghyun, L. Sungjin, W. Dongho, and K. Seungjoo, 
"Efficient Secure Group Communications for SCADA," Power 
Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 25, pp. 714-722, 2010. 
[51] C. Donghyun, K. Hakman, W. Dongho, and K. Seungjoo, 
"Advanced Key-Management Architecture for Secure SCADA 
Communications," Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, 
pp. 1154-1163, 2009. 
[52] C. L. Beaver, D.R. Gallup, W. D. NeuMann, and a. M. D. 
Torgerson. Key Management for SCADA [Online]. Available: 
http://energy.sandia.gov/wp/wp-
content/gallery/uploads/013252.pdf 
[53] T. Huei-Ru, "A secure and privacy-preserving communication 
protocol for V2G networks," in Wireless Communications and 
Networking Conference (WCNC), 2012 IEEE, 2012, pp. 2706-
2711. 
[54] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, "LEAP+: Efficient security 
mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks," ACM 
Trans. Sen. Netw., vol. 2, pp. 500-528, 2006. 
[55] W. Chung Kei, M. Gouda, and S. S. Lam, "Secure group 
communications using key graphs," Networking, IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on, vol. 8, pp. 16-30, 2000. 
[56] C. Donghyun, L. Sungjin, W. Dongho, and K. Seungjoo, 
"Efficient Secure Group Communications for SCADA," Power 
Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 25, pp. 714-722, 2010. 
[57] C. Donghyun, K. Hakman, W. Dongho, and K. Seungjoo, 
"Advanced Key-Management Architecture for Secure SCADA 
Communications," Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, 
pp. 1154-1163, 2009. 
[58] C. L. Beaver, D.R. Gallup, W. D. NeuMann, and a. M. D. 
Torgerson. Key Management for SCADA [Online]. Available: 
http://energy.sandia.gov/wp/wp-
content/gallery/uploads/013252.pdf 
[59] T. Huei-Ru, "A secure and privacy-preserving communication 
protocol for V2G networks," in Wireless Communications and 
Networking Conference (WCNC), 2012 IEEE, 2012, pp. 2706-
2711. 
[60] L. Yee Wei, M. Palaniswami, G. Kounga, and A. Lo, "WAKE: 
Key management scheme for wide-area measurement systems in 
smart grid," Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 51, pp. 34-41, 
2013. 
 Journal of Computer Sciences and Applications 39 
 
[61] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, "LEAP+: Efficient security 
mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks," ACM 
Trans. Sen. Netw., vol. 2, pp. 500-528, 2006. 
[62] L. Yue, "Design of a Key Establishment Protocol for Smart Home 
Energy Management System," in Computational Intelligence, 
Communication Systems and Networks (CICSyN), 2013 Fifth 
International Conference on, 2013, pp. 88-93. 
[63] J.-Y. Kim and H.-K. Choi, "An efficient and versatile key 
management protocol for secure smart grid communications," in 
Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 
2012 IEEE, 2012, pp. 1823-1828. 
[64] W. Dapeng and Z. Chi, "Fault-Tolerant and Scalable Key 
Management for Smart Grid," Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, 
vol. 2, pp. 375-381, 2011. 
[65] H. Nicanfar, P. Jokar, and V. C. M. Leung, "Smart grid 
authentication and key management for unicast and multicast 
communications," in Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Asia 
(ISGT), 2011 IEEE PES, 2011, pp. 1-8. 
[66] Gyorgy Dan, King-Shan Lui, Rehana Tabassum, Quanyan Zhu, 
and Klara Nahrstedt3, "SELINDA: A Secure, Scalable and Light-
Weight Data Collection Protocol for Smart Grids," IEEE 
Smartgridcomm 2013 Symposium-smart grid cybersecurity and 
privacy pp. 480-485, 2013. 
[67] Fangming Zhao, Yoshikazu Hanatani, Yuichi Komano, Ben 
Smyth, Satoshi Ito, Tom Kambayashi, "Secure Authenticated Key 
Exchange with Revocation for Smart Grid". IEEE. 2011. 
[68] H. Nicanfar and V. C. M. Leung, "Password-authenticated cluster-
based group key agreement for smart grid communication," 
security and communication networks vol. 2, pp. 221-233, 2014. 
[69] Kuan Zhang, Rongxing Lu, Xiaohui Liang, Jian Qiao, and Xuemin 
(Sherman) Shen, " PARK: A Privacy-preserving Aggregation 
Scheme with Adaptive Key Management for Smart Grid," 
IEEE/CIC international conference on communication in china 
(ICCC): QRS: QOS, Reliability and security, 2013, pp. 236-241. 
[70] Depeng Li, Zeyar Aung, John R. Williams & Abel Sanchez," No 
peeking: privacy-preserving demand response system in smart 
grids," International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed 
Systems (2013). 
[71] J. Kamto, L. Qian, J. Fuller, J. Attia, “Light-weight key 
distribution and management for Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure”, IEEE International Workshop on Smart Grid 
Communications and Networks, 2011. 
[72] J. Kamto, L. Qian, J. Fuller, J. Attia and Y. Qian, “Key 
Distribution and Management for Power Aggregation and 
Accountability in Advance Metering Infrastructure," IEEE 
Smartgridcomm 2012 Symposium-cybersecurity and privacy, pp. 
360-365. 2012. 
[73] S.H. Seo, X. Ding and E. Bertino, "Encryption Key Management 
for Secure Communication in Smart Advanced Metering 
Infrastructures," IEEE Smartgridcomm 2013 Symposium-
cybersecurity and privacy, pp. 498-503. 2013. 
[74] H. Nicanfar, P. Jokar, K. Beznosov, and V. C. M. Leung, 
"Efficient Authentication and key management mechanisms for 
smart grid communications", IEEE systems journal 2013. 
[75] M. Badra and S. Zeadally, "Design and Performance Analysis of a 
virtual ring architecture for smart grid privacy", IEEE transactions 
on information forensics and security, vol. 9, no. 2, 2014. 
[76] M. Nabeel, S. Kerr, X. Ding, E. Bertino, " Authentication and Key 
Management for Advanced Metering Infrastructures Utilizing 
Physically Unclonable Functions", IEEE Smartgridcomm 2012 
Symposium-cybersecurity and privacy. pp. 324-329. 
[77] B. Gassend, D. Clarke, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas, “Silicon 
physical random functions,” in CCS ’02. New York, NY, USA: 
ACM, 2002, pp. 148-160. 
[78] X. Long, D. Tipper, and Y. Qian, "An Advanced Key 
Management Scheme for Secure Smart Grid Communications", 
IEEE Smartgridcomm 2013 Symposium-cybersecurity and 
privacy. pp. 504-509. 
[79] P. V. Jasud, M. D. Katkar, S. D. Kamble, "Authentication 
Mechanism for Smart Grid Network International Journal of Soft 
Computing and Engineering (IJSCE). 
[80] M. Ibrahim, M. M. Salama, "Smart distribution system volt/VAR 
control using distributed intelligence and wireless communication" 
in IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, 9 (4), 2015, 307-
318. 
[81] Bashar Alohali, Madjid Merabti, and Kashif Kifayat "Key 
Management in Smart Grid: A Survey", ISBN: 978-1-902560-27-
4. 
 
